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ABSTRACT 
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 This paper examines the interaction between exposure to gender inequality and 
commonly-held sexist beliefs and effects on participants’ emotional reactions and 
behavioral intentions to address that inequality.  Male and female participants were 
exposed to gender disparities where women are disadvantaged or to a control condition 
and then primed with hostile or benevolent sexism.  No difference existed in men’s 
reports of guilt in response to gender inequality if offered a benevolently sexist 
justification.  Women were more likely than men to report moral outrage, although the 
difference was larger when participants also considered female disadvantage.  When 
reminded of both gender inequality and benevolent sexism, participants reported more 
program support than when exposed to benevolent sexism alone.  Hostile sexism did not 
lead to changes in intended program support, regardless of exposure to inequality.  Moral 
outrage was positively correlated with support for female-targeted programs, while guilt 
was not.  This research clarifies the role that sexist justifications have in maintaining 
gender inequality by showing that benevolent sexism reduces male guilt and male and 
female support for programs promoting gender equality while hostile sexism does not.  It 
also indicates that other-focused moral outrage is a stronger motivator to action than self-
focused guilt. 
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Emotional Responses to Gender-Based Inequality: Justifications and Consequences 
 Gender inequality continues to exist in a variety of forms throughout the world 
(Peterson & Runyan, 1993).  Wood & Eagly (2002) noted that gender inequality is 
usually exhibited in the form of patriarchy, or a social structure in which men are entitled 
to more assets, power, and privilege than women.  Not only are women deprived of both 
financial and leadership opportunities in the work force when compared to men, even 
when controlling for type of job and qualifications (Jacobs, 1995), but they are also more 
likely than men to fall below the poverty line (Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 2006) and are 
more likely to be victimized through sexual assault and domestic abuse (Heise & Garcia-
Moreno, 2002; Tjaden & Theonnes, 2006).  As such, gender inequality produces many 
deficits in women’s everyday lives that put them at a relative disadvantage to men.  
Given the pervasive gender inequality that exists world-wide, as well as in the United 
States, it is clear that increased understanding of factors that may contribute to the 
maintenance and, conversely, the abatement of gender inequality is necessary in the 
pursuit of social justice.   
 It seems natural to expect that individuals’ reactions will vary when exposed to 
the disparity that exists between men’s and women’s experiences.  Researchers have 
found that individuals confronted with group-based inequality experience emotional 
distress in several forms, the most frequently studied including collective guilt and moral 
outrage (Boeckmann & Feather, 2007; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002: Harvey 
& Oswald, 2000; Schmitt et al., 2000; Schmitt et al., 2004; Schmitt et al., 2008).  To date, 
however, little evidence has been presented in support of a causal relationship between 
types of beliefs that influence men’s and women’s reactions when faced with gender 
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inequality.  The goal of the current study is to build on previous research on emotional 
reactions experienced by individuals when confronted with gender inequality and the 
behavioral consequences resulting from these emotional reactions.  We also examined 
whether hostile or benevolently sexist stereotypes about women serve as justifications of 
inequality.   
Reactions to Social Inequality  
 Two possible reactions to perception of group-based inequality include collective 
guilt and moral outrage.  Collective guilt refers to negative feelings of distress 
experienced by members of a privileged group when they become aware that members of 
their ingroup have imposed harm and wrongdoing on members of a disadvantaged group 
(Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002).  An ingroup refers to a particular social group 
with which an individual feels a shared connection, membership, or devotion (Allport, 
1954).  A key feature of collective guilt that distinguishes it from typical feelings of guilt 
is that it need not result from an action personally committed by the individual 
experiencing that guilt (Doosje et al., 1998).  Instead, it results from the knowledge that 
the broader social group to which one belongs benefits from unfair advantage that 
consequently places others at a relative disadvantage.  Moral outrage, on the other hand, 
describes different feelings of distress over injustice or inequality.  Montada and 
Schneider (1989) describe the difference by proposing that, rather than being a self-
accusation, moral outrage is a feeling of anger or reprimand toward others for their 
responsibility in perceived injustice.  In other words, the difference between the two 
concepts lies in the fact that collective guilt appears to be ‘self-focused’ (even if there is 
no actual blame directed towards the self for personal wrongdoing, there can be blame 
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directed towards the self purely for one’s membership in a privileged group), while moral 
outrage is ‘other-focused.’  This differential focus could potentially impact behavioral 
responses to awareness of inequality.  
 The majority of the research on collective guilt has centered on racial prejudice – 
in particular, collective guilt experienced by Whites when considering their own 
unearned privileges and past harms committed against Blacks (Harvey & Oswald, 2000; 
Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999).  The idea of collective 
guilt and its relationship to support for programs that reduce injustice and inequality has 
evolved primarily from the work of Shelby Steele (1990).  Steele argued that “White 
guilt” is a particular type of guilt that some Whites feel after acknowledging both that 
they are members of a group that receives unearned advantages and also that they have 
either participated in or been indifferent, unwilling, or even unable to do anything to 
minimize the subordination of minority groups.  For example, White individuals who 
reported feelings of collective guilt were also more likely to acknowledge the existence 
of White privilege and the actuality of discrimination against Blacks (Swim & Miller, 
1999).  Similarly, white participants who watched a video containing footage of a Civil 
Rights protest in which Black children were brutally attacked by both dogs and police 
reported feeling collective guilt (Harvey & Oswald, 2000).  This previous research 
suggests that collective guilt and moral outrage, at least sometimes, occur upon 
awareness of social inequities (Czopp & Monteith, 2003: Boeckman & Feather, 2007; 
Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Schmitt et al., 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999; Wakslak et al., 
2007).   
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It is important to understand how these emotional responses may result in 
behavioral actions, such as working to create equality or other reparatory measures.  
Harvey and Oswald (2000) found that White participants’ collective guilt predicted 
support for Black targeted programs on campus.  In contrast, Wakslak et al. (2007) 
examined the relationships between endorsement of system-justifying ideology, 
existential guilt and moral outrage, and support for programs promoting the redistribution 
of resources to aid the disadvantaged and found that moral outrage, not existential guilt, 
correlated with resource reapportionment.  Wakslak and colleagues suggested that moral 
outrage influences individuals’ support for programs that promote social equality because 
moral outrage (as discussed above) is an other-focused emotion (see also Iyer, Leach & 
Crosby, 2003).  By leaving out the role of the self in maintaining group-based inequality, 
the emphasis remains on the plight of the disadvantaged, which garners support for 
programs that serve to reduce intergroup-inequality.  In contrast, the self-focus of feelings 
of guilt might involve retracting from the desire to reach out to help others because the 
focus is placed on reducing the personal distress associated with uncomfortable emotions.  
 Preliminary research has also found that men report collective guilt in regard to 
gender inequality (Boeckmann & Feather. 2007; Schmitt et al., 2000; Schmitt et al., 
2004; Schmitt et al., 2008).  Using survey methodology, Schmitt et al. (2000) asked male 
participants if they felt guilty for women’s disadvantaged and unfair position.  They 
found that guilt was the best predictor of men’s expressed intentions to do what they 
could to make the situation between men and women more equal.  In an experimental 
study, Schmitt et al. (2008) induced awareness of relative privilege in male participants 
and then gave them an opportunity to help women by collecting signatures on a petition.  
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The experimenters manipulated the difficulty of the opportunity to repair inequality by 
asking participants to collect 5, 50, or 100 signatures.  Men who were asked to collect 50 
signatures were significantly more likely to report feelings of collective guilt than those 
who were asked to collect either 5 signatures or 100 signatures.  The findings suggest that 
if the reparatory act is perceived as too difficult, the self’s role in repairing inequality 
feels out of reach in proportion to one’s guilt, which may provide a justification for 
inaction.  Likewise, if the reparatory act is perceived as too easy, perhaps the inequality 
does not seem to be a worthy problem that needs to be addressed.  While this research 
provides support for the argument that negative emotional responses to inequality do 
occur in some men when confronted with inequality, to date there has been no research 
that considers women’s reactions to gender inequality.  
 System Justification Theory  
 One might wonder why, despite distressing emotional reactions experienced in 
the face of gender inequality, this inequality continues to exist to the extent that it does in 
societies around the world.  System justification theory offers a possible explanation for 
this puzzling phenomenon (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  The theory suggests that individuals 
engage in a “process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the 
expense of personal and group interest” (p. 2).  The rationale for this type of behavior is 
that the maintenance (or justification) of the societal status quo is necessary in order for 
the individual to view his or her world as just (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). 
Endorsement of legitimizing ideologies may serve to minimize negative 
emotional reactions to inequality and ultimately justify the status quo.  Such justifying 
beliefs might include the belief that the world is fair and that, as such, women’s status 
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relative to men is reasonable when taking into account commonly-held gender 
stereotypes.  Wakslak et al. (2007) found that high-system-justification is associated with 
less negative affect and less moral outrage in regards to economic inequality than is low-
system-justification.  However, only other-focused moral outrage mediated the influence 
of system justification on support for resource redistribution.  Individuals who were 
exposed to system justification showed diminished levels of negative affect and moral 
outrage.  Participants who endorsed moral outrage, thus placing focus outward on the 
disadvantaged group, were more willing to help by indicating support for resource 
reapportionment.  If the distressing emotions were aimed inward (as occurs with guilt), 
participants were not as likely to support the creation of programs to help the 
disadvantaged.  These findings suggest that, in the case of gender inequality, disparity 
may continue because acknowledging that the social structure is not equitable can have 
psychological disadvantages for the individual, such as anxiety and/or discomfort (see 
Jost & Hunyday, 2003).  
 In regard to gender inequality, commonly held sexist stereotypes may serve as 
justifications for the persistence of these inequalities (Glick & Fiske, 2001).  While 
sexism has previously been understood primarily as hostile disparaging of members of a 
certain gender, researchers have begun to understand that it has, in fact, two very 
different but related facets.  Glick and Fiske (1996) introduced these two facets under the 
fitting labels of hostile sexism and benevolent sexism.  Hostile sexism is perhaps the more 
salient of the two.  It derives from Allport’s (1954) classic components of prejudice as 
“an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because 
he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities 
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ascribed to the group” (Allport, 1954, p. 7).  In contrast, benevolent sexism refers to 
stereotypical views of women’s characteristics and roles.    Benevolent sexism appears to 
encompass a variety of “traditional” views of women, with men as the protective 
providers and women as reliant on them for support.  In this way, these traditional views 
may serve to justify the current system in which women are at a relative disadvantage 
when compared to men.  Glick et al. (2000) found that hostile and benevolent sexism are 
correlated in the range of .40 to .50 in both men and women residing in the United States.  
This suggests that they tap into related aspects of the concept of sexism.  It is interesting 
to note that both men and women tend to endorse both hostile sexism and benevolent 
sexism (a phenomenon that is true across a variety of countries throughout the world), 
with women typically endorsing less hostile sexism than men but similar amounts of 
benevolent sexism. 
 While benevolent sexism may appear harmless, it has been shown to have a 
variety of ill effects for women.  World-wide endorsement of both hostile sexism and 
benevolent sexism predict inequality (Glick et al., 2000).  Reports of both hostile and 
benevolent sexism are negatively correlated to national evaluations of gender equality, as 
measured by indices assessing both women’s occupation of high-status jobs as well as 
women’s relative achievement with respect to level of education, income, and life 
expectancy, indicated by the Gender-related Development Index put forth by the United 
Nations (see United Nations, 1995).  These findings suggest that it is the combination of 
seeing women as incompetent and unjustly “taking” opportunities from men (hostile 
sexism) but also in need of particular care and consideration from men (benevolent 
sexism) that potentially contributes to maintaining gender inequality in today’s society.  
 8 
In endorsing hostile and benevolent sexism, men may be able to diminish potentially 
distressing emotional reactions, such as collective guilt, that could cause anxiety or 
discomfort.  At the same time, women, believing they need this particular care and 
consideration as a result of their gender, may experience less outrage at their unjust 
position in society.  
 While these relationships are correlational in nature and thus cannot imply 
causality, researchers have also been able to explore causal relationships between gender 
stereotypes and the system-justification processes.  Jost and Kay (2005) exposed male 
and female participants to hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, a combination of both 
hostile and benevolent sexism, a non-stereotypical control, or to a true “nothing” control.  
Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with gender-specific system-
justifying ideology.  They found that women who were exposed to benevolent 
stereotypes were higher in system justification than women exposed to non-stereotypical 
traits.  Hostile stereotypes and non-stereotypical trait exposure did not affect women’s 
justification of the current social system.  Thus, when women are reminded of 
subjectively positive yet stereotypical traits often associated with their gender group, they 
are more likely to justify the current American system.  It appears as if the subjectively 
positive valence of benevolent sexism and other complementary stereotypes leads women 
to see these “feminine” traits or qualities as good or beneficial, prompting them to justify 
the system and support the status quo.  Men’s exposure to stereotypes of any kind was 
unrelated to reports of system justification.  However, men’s endorsement of gender-
specific system justification was higher overall than was women’s, suggesting that men 
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are already endorsing gender-specific system justification of inequality and do not need 
to be reminded of sexism in order to do so.  
Current Study 
 In sum, this research suggests that, when reminded of gender-based inequality, 
men report distressing emotional reactions (Boeckmann & Feather, 2007; Schmitt et al., 
2000; Schmitt et al., 2004; Schmitt et al., 2008).  To date, no research has examined 
women’s emotional reactions to gender-based inequality.  However, it seems likely that 
women will respond with more moral outrage than do men because it is their group that is 
disadvantaged.  In the current study we seek to examine both men’s and women’s 
reactions to gender based inequality.  
 Furthermore, based on previous research, we propose that hostile and benevolent 
sexism should serve to justify inequality and thus reduce negative emotional reactions to 
gender-based inequality, although this effect should differ for men and women.  Finally, 
because the literature is mixed in terms of the difference between self-focused guilt and 
other-focused outrage in their ability to predict support for programs to help the 
disadvantaged, we seek to examine how these emotions differentially predict support for 
programs to reduce inequality. 
The current study randomly assigned both male and female participants to be 
exposed to either gender inequality or a control condition (no mention of gender 
inequality), followed by exposure to a justification for this inequality (either hostile 
sexism or benevolent sexism).  Participants then completed measures of collective guilt 
and moral outrage as well as a measure designed to assess willingness to support female-
targeted programs. 
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It is hypothesized that men who are exposed to gender inequality will be more 
likely than men who were not exposed to gender inequality to report collective guilt, 
moral outrage, and to support programs that promote gender equality.  However, sexist 
justification should eliminate negative emotional reactions in men.  Specifically, men 
who are exposed to gender inequality and then offered either hostile or benevolent sexist 
beliefs will report less collective guilt, moral outrage, and support for female-targeted 
programs than if they were just exposed to gender inequality alone.   
 For women, exposure to inequality should have a different impact on emotional 
distress.  Research (e.g., Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006) indicates that women will 
not experience collective guilt, since the inequality exposure used in this study does not 
portray their gender group as having unearned privileges that put another group at a 
disadvantage.  It is hypothesized that women who are confronted with gender inequality 
will experience moral outrage.  Sexist justifications will minimize these emotions only 
when the justifications are benevolent.  We predict that women will still experience moral 
outrage if exposed to hostile sexism.  Thus, while both hostile and benevolent sexist 
beliefs should justify inequality for men and reduce their emotional reactions of guilt and 
outrage, only benevolent sexism will function to justify gender inequality among women. 
Finally, we seek to examine how emotional reactions are associated with 
perceptions of importance to fund organizations that promote gender equality.  We 
hypothesize that moral outrage, but not collective guilt, will be correlated with support 
for programs to promote gender equality.   
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Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and forty-four college students from a mid-sized private 
Midwestern university participated in this study for partial course credit.  Forty-seven 
percent of the participants were male (n = 115), while 53% were female (n = 129).  Fifty-
seven percent of the participants were freshmen in college (n = 138), 25% were 
sophomores (n = 62), 8% were juniors (n = 22), and 9% were seniors (n = 22).  Eighty-
six percent of the participants reported that they identify as Caucasian American (n = 
209), followed by 8% as Latino/Latina (n = 19), 4% as African American (n = 11), 3% as 
Asian American (n = 8), 3% as citizens from another country (n = 6), 2% as Biracial (n = 
4), and less than 1% as other (n = 2). Participants ranged from 18- to 39-years-old, with a 
median age of 19 years. 
 Of these 244 participants, 7 were removed from the analyses after indicating in 
the believability check that they understood the nature of the relationship between the 
three aspects of the study.  A total of 237 participants remained.  
Procedure and Measures 
 Initial procedures. Upon entering the research lab where data collection took 
place, an undergraduate research assistant obtained informed consent from all 
participants.  Participants were then given a cover story explaining that their participation 
would include a series of three short and unrelated studies that are compiled into one to 
make them more time efficient and to, therefore, maximize their extra credit.  They were 
told that the main goal of the study was to look at the emotional development of college 
students; however, because of the short length of that study, they will also be asked first 
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to provide feedback on surveys being piloted for another study (this will be the gender 
inequality and justification prime conditions) and then also to fill out a funding survey 
put out by the university’s financial planning committee that asks for their opinion on the 
reallocation of funds among various campus programs. 
 Perceived Social Inequity Scale–Women’s Form (PSIS–W) prime.  To 
manipulate awareness of gender-based inequality, half of the participants were asked to 
proofread parts of Corning’s (2000) Perceived Social Inequity Scale–Women’s Form and 
the other half were asked to preview a filler survey that did not mention gender.  
Specifically, those in the inequality prime condition were exposed to comments that 
juxtapose women’s and men’s experiences in a number of different areas where women 
consistently have the worse outcome.  For example, for the three following topics, 
participants were exposed to two subitems each: “To what extent do women alter their 
career plans to accommodate child-raising,” and “To what extent do men alter their 
career plans to accommodate child-raising,” or “To what extent do men take precautions 
to guard themselves against sexual assault,” and “To what extent to women take 
precautions to guard themselves against sexual assault,” or “To what extent are women 
affected by the way women are portrayed on TV or in magazines,” and “To what extent 
are men affected by the way men are portrayed on TV or in magazines?”   
 The goal of the current research was to determine whether or not priming 
awareness of inequality would influence the way participants react to gender inequality.  
Therefore, the participants were asked only to proofread the items, rather than to endorse 
them.  Jost & Kay (2005) found that mere exposure to commonly held gender stereotypes 
is enough to increase support for a system of inequality. If the participants were asked to 
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agree or disagree with the items, they may go through the process of consciously and 
explicitly disagreeing with them, which has the potential to reduce the effect of the 
exposure.  Instead, instructions guided the participants to read the items given to them 
and to indicate whether or not they felt that each item was ambiguously worded.  They 
were given the option of rating each item on a scale ranging from 0 (not worded clearly 
at all) to 5 (worded perfectly clearly). 
 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory prime.  The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory was 
used to manipulate the priming of sex-based stereotypes.  One half of the participants 
read the items that compose the hostile sexism subscale (e.g., “Most women fail to 
appreciate fully all that men do for them,” and “Many women get a kick out of teasing 
men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances”), while the other 
half of the participants read the items that compose the benevolent sexism subscale (e.g., 
“Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess,” “Men should be willing to 
sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their 
lives,” and “In a disaster, women should be rescued before men”).  Instructions guided 
the participants to read the items given to them and to indicate whether or not they felt 
that each item was clearly worded.  They were given the option of rating each item on a 
scale ranging from 0 (not worded clearly at all) to 5 (worded perfectly clearly).  
 Self-report measures.  Following the above gender inequality and sexism 
primes, all participants completed a number of self-report measures that followed one 
another as separate, computerized questionnaires in the private rooms of the research lab.  
 Personal Feelings Questionnaire–2 (PFQ–2).  Harder & Zalma (1990) revised 
the Harder Personal Feelings Questionnaire (Harder & Lewis, 1987) to form a scale 
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composed of 10 items that make up a Shame subscale and 6 items that make up a Guilt 
subscale.  While the scale was originally intended to measure more general, “trait” 
experiences of these emotions, it was altered for the purposes of this study to a “state” 
measurement of shame and guilt.  This method has been used in previous research (see 
Harvey & Oswald, 2000) and has the goal of obtaining information about participants’ 
present emotional state.  In this case, only the Guilt subscale was included.  Participants 
were asked to respond to the items on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (no feeling) to 7 
(high feeling) in regard to the degree to which he or she was currently experiencing the 
particular affect.  The Guilt subscales possess good psychometric properties with the 
current sample (α = .87).   
 Moral outrage measure.  Participants completed the moral outrage scale 
developed by Wakslak et al. (2007).  The scale assessed their feelings of anger and 
distress over injustice and inequality (e.g., “I feel really angry when I learn about people 
who are suffering from injustice”).  Participants rated each item on a 6-point scale 
ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly).  This scale maintains good 
psychometric properties, with an internal consistency of Cronbach’s alpha of .84.  
 Demographics. Participants completed several questions related to demographics, 
including age, sex, year in college, race/ethnicity, and yearly family income.  This 
questionnaire was given toward the end of the study in order to control for effects that 
could result from reminding individuals of their gender before asking them to fill out 
measures in which gender issues are discussed. 
 Support for programs to reduce gender inequality.  Once participants finished 
completing the self-report and demographic questionnaires, they were asked to complete 
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a paper survey said to be put out by the university’s financial planning committee.  The 
research assistant explained that, due to economic concerns, funding was being 
reallocated among various campus programs and that the committee was interested in 
polling students to determine their opinions about how this money should be dispersed.  
The research assistant assured participants that little additional time would be required, 
since the survey only consists of 13 items, which should take less than 5 minutes to 
complete.  The questionnaire used was adapted from Harvey & Oswald’s (2000) 
questionnaire measuring students’ support for Black programs.  Students were asked to 
rate the importance of giving university funding to four programs promoting gender 
equality: Women in Business, Women in Academia, Society for Female Undergraduates, 
and Empowerment (a feminist group on campus).  These organizations were placed 
among nine additional unrelated programs.  Participants were asked to rate their beliefs 
about the importance of giving funding to each of these organizations on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very important) to 7 (very unimportant).  Consistency of the subscale of 
the female targeted programs was computed with lower scores indicating greater 
importance to fund (Cronbach’s α = .83). 
  Believability check.  Last, participants were asked to answer an open-ended 
question on paper asking them to explain in their own words what they believed the study 
to be about.  Participants who correctly guessed the relatedness of the three portions of 
the study were excluded from the analyses, as being aware of the study’s aims could 
potentially influence responding.  Finally, participants were debriefed as to the true 
nature of the study and thanked for their participation. 
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Results 
 A factorial ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of sex, exposure to 
inequality, and exposure to sexist justification on collective guilt, as measured by the 
Guilt subscale of Harder’s PFQ-2.  The results indicated that there was not a significant 
main effect for sex (F(1, 229) = .94, p = .33).  The main effects for inequality prime (F(1, 
229) = .14, p = .71), and sexist justification exposure (F(1, 229) = .005, p = .94) were not 
significant.  
  None of the two-way interactions were significant; however, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between sex, inequality exposure, and justification 
exposure, F(1, 229) = 3.97, p = .048, η2 = .02. Simple effects tests for men who were 
exposed to hostile sexism indicated that men exposed to gender inequality (M = 2.47, SD 
= 1.69) reported more guilt than those who were not exposed to gender inequality (M = 
1.75, SD = .90), F(1, 229) = 4.25, p < .05, Figure 1a.  For men exposed to benevolent 
sexism, no significant difference existed based on exposure to gender inequality 
(Minequality prime = 2.00, SD = .88, Mno inequality prime = 2.29, SD = 1.45, F(1, 229) = .73, p > 
.10).  For women exposed to hostile sexism, no significant differences in reports of guilt 
existed between groups based on inequality exposure (Minequality prime = 1.87, SD = .1.30, 
Mno inequality prime = 2.12, SD = 1.34, F(1, 229) = .59, p > .10, Figure 1b).  Similarly, for 
women exposed to benevolent sexism, no significant differences in reports of guilt 
existed between groups based on inequality exposure (Minequality prime = 1.97, SD = 1.35, 
Mno inequality prime = 1.90, SD = 1.18, F(1, 229) = .05, p > .10). 
 For moral outrage, the factorial ANOVA results indicated that there was a 
significant main effect of sex, F(1, 229) = 13.02, p < .001, η2 = .05, suggesting that men 
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(M = 4.21, SD = .81) reported less moral outrage than did women (M = 4.59, SD = .76).  
Main effects of inequality exposure and justification exposure were not significant (F(1, 
229) = .01, p = .92 and F(1, 229) = .05, p = .82, respectively).   
The main effect of sex was moderated by a marginally significant interaction with 
inequality prime exposure, F(1, 229) = 2.83, p = .09, η2 = .01, see Figure 3.  A simple 
effect test comparing men and women who were not exposed to gender inequality was 
significant (F(1, 229) = 6.47, p < .05), suggesting that women not exposed to gender 
inequality (M = 4.51, SD = .73) reported more moral outrage than did men not exposed to 
gender inequality (M = 4.20, SD = .79), see Figure 2.  When exposed to gender 
inequality, men’s reports of moral outrage (M = 4.11, SD = .85) were still significantly 
less than women’s moral outrage (M = 4.65, SD = .76); however, the difference between 
men and women was larger in this condition (F(1, 229) = 21.06, p < .001, η2inequality prime = 
.10, η2no inequality prime = .04).  Neither the interaction between gender and justification 
exposure, F(1, 229) = .63, p = .43, nor the interaction between inequality exposure and 
justification exposure, F(1, 229) = .12, p = .73, were significant.  The three-way 
interaction also was not significant, F(1, 229) = .25, p = .52. 
 For support for campus programs supporting gender equality, the main effect for 
gender was significant, F(1, 226) = 19.13, p < .001, η2 = .08).  Men (M = 4.14, SD = 1.28) 
were less likely to support programs promoting gender equality than were women (M = 
3.44, SD = 1.16).  Main effects for inequality exposure and justification exposure were 
not significant, F(1, 226) = .52, p = .47 and F(1, 226) = .13, p = .72, respectively.  There 
was a marginally significant interaction between exposure to inequality and exposure to 
justification, F(1, 226) = 3.16, p = .07, η2 = .01.  A simple effects test comparing 
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inequality exposure condition to the no inequality exposure condition, for those also 
exposed to benevolent sexism, was significant, F(1, 226) = 4.00, p < .05, Figure 3.  Those 
exposed to an inequality prime before being exposed to benevolent sexism (M = 3.58, SD 
= 1.21) showed greater support for programs promoting gender equality than did those 
not exposed to an inequality prime prior to being exposed to benevolent sexism (M = 
4.02, SD = 1.35).  A simple effects test comparing inequality exposure condition to the no 
inequality exposure condition, for those also exposed to hostile sexism, was not 
significant, Minequality prime = 3.84, SD = 1.67, Mno inequality prime = 3.68, SD = 1.33, F(1, 226) 
= .46, p > .10.   
 Finally we examined the associations between emotional reactions and support for 
programs promoting gender equality.  A hierarchical multiple regression was used to 
assess the capacity for guilt, moral outrage, gender, the interaction between guilt and 
gender, and the interaction between moral outrage and gender to predict support for 
programs promoting gender equality.  Guilt and moral outrage were mean centered and 
two-way interaction terms were computed with gender.  In the first block, gender, guilt, 
and moral outrage were included as predictors.  The model was statistically significant (F 
(3, 230) = 11.56, p < .001; R2 = .13).  Specifically, moral outrage (β = -.23, p < .001) and 
gender (β = -.23, p < .001) were negatively associated with program support, while guilt 
(β = -.07, p = .24) was not significantly associated with program support.  Program 
support was measured with lower numbers reflecting greater support.  Thus, greater 
moral outrage was associated with more support for programs to reduce gender 
inequality, as was being female.  In the second block, the two-way interactions did not 
significantly contribute to predicting program support (F change (5, 228) = .81, p = .45; R2 
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change = .006), suggesting that there was not a meaningful interaction between participant 
gender and the type of emotional reaction experienced in their ability to predict support 
for programs promoting gender equality.  
Discussion 
 These findings offer mixed support for the study’s hypotheses and, in doing so, 
contribute interesting insight into research on emotional responses to gender inequality.  
As expected, women report less guilt compared to men when confronted with gender 
inequality.  As the underprivileged group, it would be unusual for women to experience 
guilt for their role in maintaining gender inequality, as is seen in men and members of 
other privileged groups (Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; 
Swim & Miller, 1999).  On the other hand, results suggest that men do experience guilt 
but only under certain circumstances.  
 The experimental design used in this study allows us to examine the causal impact 
of hostile and benevolent sexist ideologies on emotional reactions and behavioral 
intentions in response to gender inequality.  For men, it appears as though hostile sexism 
did not justify gender inequality and reduce guilt, as was hypothesized.  Because hostile 
sexism is blatant and overt (Glick & Fiske, 1996), it may be that today’s college-age men 
find it unacceptable.  Instead of offering justification, hearing openly hostile remarks 
directed toward women after men are reminded of existing gender inequality appears to 
have solidified their guilt reaction.  However, without the gender inequality prime, hostile 
sexism alone does not appear to be enough to prompt men to feel guilty. 
 In contrast, men who were exposed to benevolent sexism did not differ in their 
guilt reaction regardless of whether or not they were exposed to gender inequality. This 
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suggests that benevolent sexism does function to justify gender inequality as suggested 
by Glick and Fiske (2001).  Benevolent sexism, perhaps because of its seemingly positive 
(yet stereotypical) view of women, may allow men to justify the existing unequal status 
of women.  In other words, benevolent sexism seems to prompt men to think that these 
inequalities exist because of qualities that women as a group are believed to possess, such 
as superior moral sensibility or the need for protection by and support from men.  Thus, 
the current system is justified as the inequality exists for a reason.  The existing status 
quo makes sense.  Why feel guilty about it? 
 When faced with the gender inequality prime, women also report more moral 
outrage than do men.  In addition, exposure to gender inequality results in greater 
polarization between women’s and men’s reports of moral outrage than occurred without 
such exposure.  Perhaps confronting women with gender inequality reinforces their 
feelings of moral outrage by forcing them to consider their relative disadvantage, while 
confronting men with gender inequality leads to feelings of defensiveness or feeling the 
need to protect the self.  In doing so, it may be that men’s expressions of outrage at social 
injustice are reduced.  Moral outrage is conceptualized as anger or reprimand directed 
toward another for his or her role in creating or maintaining injustice (Montada and 
Schneider, 1989). When confronted with depictions of gender inequality in which women 
are disadvantaged, men may consider their own role in maintaining an unjust system.  In 
discussing his theory of emotional intensity, Brehm (1999) proposes that emotions 
function to promote arousal, the purpose of which is to respond in some way to the 
situation that created the emotion, whether through action or inaction.  The dissonance 
created by being a subject of their own outrage might serve as a deterrent to experiencing 
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moral outrage at gender inequality.  Thus, perhaps men experience less outrage to protect 
themselves from the dissonance that this creates. 
Interestingly, contrary to hypotheses, neither hostile sexism nor benevolent sexism 
influenced participants’ expressions of moral outrage.  Perhaps this discrepancy is related 
to how we operationally defined the variables.  While guilt was measured as a current 
emotional experience not related to any cause, moral outrage was measured as an 
emotional response to social inequality, specifically.  It may be that students already had 
preexisting attitudes about inequality, and the sexism justifications did not override those 
attitudes. 
 In addition to feeling more moral outrage, women were also more likely than men 
to support programs aimed at reducing gender inequality.  Given the adverse effects of 
gender inequality for women (Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002; Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 
2006; Jacobs, 1995; Tjaden & Theonnes, 2006), it is not surprising that women are more 
invested than men in taking action to correct it.   
 Participants who were exposed to benevolent sexism and the gender inequality 
prime reported more support for female-targeted programs than did those exposed to 
benevolent sexism without also being exposed to gender inequality.  However, for 
participants exposed to hostile sexism, support for gender-specific programs was 
unchanged by previous exposure to inequality.  Perhaps exposure to benevolent sexism 
without an initial reminder about women’s unfair advantage prompted only subjectively 
positive feelings about women’s current status. Thus, people did not feel a need to 
support programs designed to reduce gender inequality.  This is consistent with Jost and 
Kay’s (2005) finding that women reminded of subjectively positive yet stereotypical 
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traits associated with their gender group are more likely to endorse system-justifying 
ideology than are women exposed to hostile sexism.  Interestingly, the current sample 
contained both men and women, suggesting that this process occurs for members of both 
sexes.  This suggests that women may not always be inspired to work toward equality if 
they are in an environment where they are reminded of benevolently sexist beliefs. 
 In examining the types of emotional reactions that are associated with the 
likelihood that an individual will take action to reduce gender inequality, we found that 
moral outrage, not guilt, predicted support for female targeted campus programs.  These 
results are consistent with research suggesting that emotion focused on the plight of 
others is a stronger motivating affective reaction than is self-focused affect (Iyer et al., 
2003; Wakslak et al., 2007).  Like moral outrage, guilt is an emotion to which most 
people respond with attempts to reduce its unpleasantness.  However, unlike moral 
outrage, in which one focuses his or her attention on the victims of social inequality, 
collective guilt implies that the individual must think of oneself and one’s own role in the 
maintenance of transgression (Branscombe et al., 2002).  Thus, it appears as though it 
would be more advantageous for action taken to reduce inequality to focus on awareness 
of the unjust circumstances of a disadvantaged group, rather than on the role that 
members of the advantaged group have in maintaining it.  
  This study is also novel in its ability to shed light on women’s emotional 
reactions to gender inequality.  Women appear to experience significantly more moral 
outrage, in general, than do men.  They also appear to experience more of this outrage 
after being exposed to gender inequality. It is possible that one reason that women 
seemed to endorse higher levels of outrage, even in the no inequality group, is because 
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these women (though not exposed to the gender inequality prime) were still exposed to 
either hostile or benevolent sexism.  The higher levels of moral outrage than expected in 
the group of women not exposed to gender inequality may have to do with exposure to 
sexism, itself, especially hostile sexism.  
 This study has potential limitations that deserve mention.  First, because 
participants were collected from a subject pool of undergraduate psychology students at a 
private, mid-sized, Midwestern university, findings may not be generalizable more 
broadly to other populations (e.g., non-student sample or different age cohorts).  It seems 
possible that young adults may respond differently to exposure to gender inequality 
because they have not (for the most part) been required to maintain the responsibilities of 
adulthood within a society that is potentially biased against (or, depending on group 
membership, in favor) of them.  A second potential limitation may be found within the 
actual technique chosen as the inequality prime.  Although much of the research 
regarding men’s emotional responses to gender inequality has used somewhat similar 
exposure mediums (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2008), it seems reasonable to think that some 
people may be less likely to respond emotionally to a prime that is delivered in written 
form.  Perhaps priming gender inequality through a different medium, such as video, may 
influence the strength of the emotional response or behavioral intention.  
 Several areas of future research are apparent.  This study suggests that it is the 
disadvantaged group that may be most inspired to carry out action to reduce the 
inequality that places them at this disadvantage.  Future research should be sure to 
include the disadvantaged group when exploring motivating emotional reactions to 
inequality.  It would also be interesting to examine other widespread ideological 
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viewpoints that may justify social inequality, such as just world beliefs, meritocracy, or 
right-wing authoritarianism.  Further insight into men’s and women’s emotional and 
behavioral responses to gender inequality may shed light on why women continue to be 
at a relative disadvantage compared to men across many domains.  The findings also 
have the potential to be generalized to other instances of group-based inequality.  
Existing social disparities based on racial or ethnic group membership, sexual orientation, 
age, education, or socioeconomic standing also may be maintained, in part, by 
commonly-held beliefs that serve as justifications for why the status quo exists as it does, 
the most dangerous of which might be inconspicuously masked in a positive tone.   
 In conclusion, this study is the first to experimentally examine how both men and 
women respond to gender-based inequality.  We find partial support for the idea that 
sexist ideologies can serve to justify the inequalities.  We also strengthen evidence for the 
conclusion that moral outrage is a stronger motivating emotion than is guilt.  The 
implications of this new area of research have the potential to be far reaching.  By 
understanding people’s reactions to social inequalities and the familiar ideological 
viewpoints that influence these reactions, we can start to determine the best method for 
reducing them.  The direction provided here is that we ought to focus on moral outrage 
and widespread ideological views that, though often invisible, keep people believing that 
unjust systems are legitimate in their current form. 
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INDEX 
 
 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables for Male and Female Participants 
 
 
 Male Female All 
Method Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
PFQ-2 Guilt 2.13 1.26 1.97 1.29 2.04 1.27 
Moral Outrage 4.21 .81 4.59 .76 4.41 .80 
SPPGE 4.14 1.28 3.44 1.16 3.77 1.27 
Note. For the PFQ-2 Guilt scale and the Moral Outrage scale, higher scores are indicative 
of more extreme responding in the direction of the construct assessed.  For the SPPGE 
scale, lower scores reflect greater support. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix among Scores on the PFQ-2 Guilt Subscale, Moral Outrage 
Scale, and the Scale Measuring Support for Programs Promoting Gender Equality 
(SPPGE) 
 
 
 
Method 1 2 3 
1.  PFQ-2 Guilt -- -.03 -.05 
2.  Moral Outrage  .-- -.28*** 
3.  SPPGE   -- 
Note. For the PFQ-2 Guilt scale and the Moral Outrage scale, higher scores are indicative 
of more extreme responding in the direction of the construct assessed.  For the SPPGE 
scale, lower scores reflect greater support. Thus, higher reports of moral outrage are 
associated with greater support for programs that reduce gender inequality.  
***p < .001 
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Figure 1a. Men’s reports of guilt based on inequality and justification exposure 
condition.  A significant difference was found in levels of reported guilt for men exposed 
to hostile sexism.  For men exposed to benevolent sexism, the difference based on 
inequality exposure condition was not significant. 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Women’s reports of guilt based on inequality and justification exposure 
condition.  No differences in levels of guilt were found regardless of inequality prime and 
justification prime conditions. 
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Figure 2. Participant’s reports of moral outrage based on inequality exposure condition.  
  
 
 
 
 33 
Figure 3. Support for programs aimed at reducing gender inequality as a function of 
inequality prime condition and justification prime condition. 
 
 
Note.  Lower numbers reflect greater support for female-targeted programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
